This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program.

Demand for rhino horn increased exponentially over the past few years. The market is heavily concentrated in Asia, particularly Vietnam. Rhino poaching has leapt to keep pace with demand. South Africa’s rhinos are among the most affected. According to the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA), in 2010, 2011, and 2012, the number of rhinos killed for their horns went from 333 to 448 to 668. So far in 2013, 216 rhinos have been poached in South Africa’s Kruger national park alone. That is more death the past five months than in the years 2000-2008 combined. The rhino population in Mozambique, which was wiped out by large game hunters a century ago and later reintroduced to the national parks, has again been eradicated; this time with the connivance of some of Mozambique’s own rangers.

Convictions for poaching and trafficking in rhino horn are rare. But the U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles, California announced on May 16 the conviction of Vinh Chung “Jimmy” Kha, and Felix Khaon for, among other crimes, smuggling rhino horn into the United States with the intent of selling it to Vietnam. In Vietnam, and other parts of Asia, powdered rhino horn is considered a cure for everything from a headache, hangover, or cold to cancer; and is also often advertised as an aphrodisiac. It holds no such properties. In fact, rhino horn is keratin, the same substance as human hair and fingernails. Despite this, rhino horn sells for between U.S. $25,000 and $40,000 per kilogram.

A Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) conference in March 2013, appears to have invigorated the international community to act to save these great creatures. South Africa is threatening to re-erect the boundary fences between the South African and Mozambican halves of Kruger national park. Some game parks in South Africa have taken the additional measure of poisoning their rhinos’ horns to deter consumer demand. The poison is combination of a parasiticide normally used against ticks on livestock and a pink dye that can be detected by airport scanners and is visible even when in powdered form; meaning potential consumers will know what they are buying. The parasiticide is not lethal, but it does make the consumer “seriously ill.” A logical next step is campaigns to raise awareness of rhino horn’s complete lack of medicinal properties and that the animals die, horribly, through the process. Similar campaigns are running in Asia against elephant poaching. They are spearheaded by celebrities such as China’s Li Bingbing, an actress and UNEP goodwill ambassador, and retired NBA basketball player Yao Ming.

These initiatives are key because they focus on a crucial truth; anti-poaching and conservation efforts must be holistic to be effective. By addressing conservation efforts not just at halting the poachers, but also in decreasing the demand for rhino horn altogether, poisoning the horns and educating consumers is an important step forward.

The University of KwaZulu-Natal has announced that starting next year, all entering students must study Zulu. Zulu is spoken by perhaps a quarter of South Africa’s population and the extensiveness of its use is probably second only to Afrikaans. However, it is an exceptionally difficult language for adults to learn, and few whites, coloreds, or Asians do so.

The university says the new requirement is designed to promote nation-building.

The University of KwaZulu-Natal is the result of the merger of the apartheid-era whites-only University of Natal with the Asians-only University of Durban-Westville. The merger was part of the effort to dismantle the educational structure of apartheid. The university now has a large black enrollment.

Thomson-Reuters’ “The World University Rankings” lists only four universities in Africa, all of which are in South Africa: the University of Cape Town, University of the Witwatersrand (“Wits”) in Johannesburg, the University of Stellenbosch (traditionally Afrikaans), and the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Thomson-Reuters ranks the University of Cape Town at 113, Wits between 226 and 250, University of Stellenbosch between 252 and 275, and KwaZulu-Natal between 351 and 400. It ranks the California Institute of Technology, Stanford, and Oxford as the top three in the world.

Everybody involved in educational policy understands the limitations of such ranking systems, but they do indicate something of relative reputations.

It remains to be seen what the consequences will be of the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s bold language experiment. Will it impact on the numbers of non-Zulu speakers who matriculate?

At the Mali Donors Conference in Brussels on May 15 the United States announced $32 million in new humanitarian assistance to support Malian refugees in neighboring countries and to the internally displaced. The same day, the U.S. Department of State spokesman said that the Obama administration will request from Congress $180 million in FY 2014 for bilateral assistance. That funding would kick-in after the Mali elections, scheduled to take place in July.

As required by U.S. law, the Obama administration terminated or suspended $188 million in assistance to Mali following the coup in March, 2012. However, the U.S. continued to provide $7 million in democracy assistance programing and $83 million in health support. With the additional $32 million pledged at Brussels, the press spokesman said the United States will be providing $181 million in humanitarian assistance—almost the same amount that had been suspended post-coup. The figures add up to only $122 million; either the he misspoke or did not mention other U.S. assistance.

Given Mali’s high profile and ongoing humanitarian disaster, U.S. assistance—both humanitarian now and bilateral after the Malian elections—is very small. But, total U.S. foreign assistance hovers around only 1 percent of the federal budget, though a November 2010 World Public Opinion Poll indicates that the “average” American thinks that it is around one quarter.

The July elections and the restoration of constitutional government will make Mali eligible for the projected $180 million in assistance in FY 2014. That may be a significant motivation for the calling of elections in July, which many observers believe to be unwise. Election preparations have hardly started, and security is not yet established in the northern part of the country. Poor elections dominated by southern politicians risk further splitting the country. Africa Confidential has a good overview of the current state of Mali’s politics and the arguments against early elections.

This is a guest post by Dr. Deirdre LaPin, co-author of Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011) and a longstanding resident and development expert on Nigeria.

 Home to Nigeria’s hugely profitable oil industry, the Niger Delta is one of the poorest places on earth. At the end of April 2013, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs unveiled a new five year Action Plan that envisions $10 billion in government and private resources to develop the beleaguered region. Persistent underdevelopment was a key driver of the Delta’s militant insurgency until a presidential amnesty for fighters brought calm in late 2009. Well-meaning donors–including the EU, the UK’s Department of Development, the World Bank, and UNDP–saw the amnesty as an opportunity for a common framework to guide provision of desperately needed services and infrastructure to the region. They also suggested marshaling resources through a Multi-Stakeholder Trust Fund.

It was an ambitious proposal. No fewer than eight prior regional development plans had achieved scant results. Still, the Delta’s profound poverty and the need to consolidate peace under the amnesty justified the risk. In spring of 2012, the UNDP overcame the tragic terrorist bombing of its headquarters in Abuja and assembled a team of Nigeria experts. They designed actions for social investment, infrastructure, and institution building and anchored them to three critical results: improved living standards, sustainable economic development, and a consolidated peace.

In May this year, they shared with government and donors a draft plan that incorporated the best collective thinking of regional stakeholders and development experts. Social investment, which spanned eight different sectors, was the most challenging. Several programs were designed for quick implementation to meet urgent human needs and the reintegration of ex-combatants. They included creating thousands of small and larger businesses; skills training and apprenticeship schemes; a Niger Delta “works” program employing thousands of youth; water supply, education, health, and IT for remote communities; and a “citizens’ report card,” for monitoring local development.

Astonishingly, it seems that the version of the Action Plan unveiled by the ministry in late April omits all of the planned strategies for social investment. In their place is an extensive agri-business program. This entrepreneurial initiative, however welcome, offers narrow benefits that cannot alone address the region’s huge deficits in jobs and basic human services. Press reports suggest that improvements to the Action Plan are still possible. One member of the amnesty team says the social investment plan should be restored to support peaceful reintegration.  Otherwise, this latest in a long series of failed plans could once again miss its targets and leave the region’s thirty-five million people angry victims of a missed opportunity.

Kenya, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and, by extension, the international community currently face the dilemma of dealing with a president and a deputy president, freely and fairly elected (more or less; many questions remain) that are charged with crimes against humanity associated with 2007 election bloodshed. Africa Confidential has an excellent review of the current state of play.

Kenya’s permanent representative to the UN, Kamau Macharia, on May 2 sent a thirteen-page letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) asking it to end the ICC cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. He argued that Kenyatta and Ruto were duly and democratically elected and could not perform their duties in the face of “an offshore trial that has no popular resonance and serves no national or international purpose.” A variation of this argument is heard among Kenyatta’s supporters; “peace” is more important than “justice,” and the ICC process should somehow go away. But, Ruto promptly disavowed the letter on the basis that the UNSC lacks the legal authority to stop the ICC proceedings. Ruto’s lawyer reaffirmed his client’s cooperation with the ICC. The attorney general of Kenya, Githu Muigal also disavowed the letter saying Kenya is not a party to the cases and has reaffirmed Kenyan cooperation with the ICC.

On May 13, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, rejected the Kenyan government’s claim that it is cooperating with the court. Specifically, she said that the government failed to provide certain financial records and has not facilitated interviews that could provide her with information about the role of the police in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. Earlier, she said that the government failed to provide adequate protection for potential witnesses and that bribery and intimidation played a role in the withdrawal of potential witnesses.

The ICC charges against Kenyatta and Ruto were an issue in the 2013 Kenyan elections and popular backlash against the Court probably helped them. Many Kenyans seemed to think the charges would be dropped in the aftermath of an election victory, probably at the instigation of the United States and the United Kingdom because of the importance of their ties with Kenya and Nairobi’s crucial role in Somalia. In fact, UK prime minster David Cameron hosted Kenyatta in London at the May 7 Somalia conference. The UK argued Kenyatta’s presence was “essential,” and, in effect, trumped British policy to have only “essential contact” with Kenyatta and Ruto. However, Africa Confidential credibly speculates that President Obama will skip Kenya during his next Africa trip and suggests, also credibly, that there will be a cooling of relations between Kenya and the UK and the U.S.

The ICC has agreed to postpone Ruto’s trial until October. Many observers think that the ICC case against him is stronger than that against Kenyatta. If the ICC were to convict one and acquit the other, there could be serious political consequences in Kenya. Kenyatta is a leader of the Kikuyu, Ruto of the Kalenjin. The two ethnic groups have long been rivals, and fighting among them was an important element in the 2007 violence. Then, Kenyatta and Ruto were on opposite sides. For 2013, they made a political alliance, and there was little fighting between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, a factor in the largely peaceful elections. A Ruto conviction and a Kenyatta acquittal might put at risk the current truce between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu.

Having cut short a trip to South Africa and annulled a planned state visit to Namibia, President Goodluck Jonathan has declared a “state of emergency” in the three northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In announcing this step, Jonathan acknowledged that there is an “insurrection” in northeast Nigeria, and that the government has lost control of certain geographic areas to “Boko Haram,” a defuse Islamist movement.

It remains to be seen if the declaration will have any practical effect. Jonathan has promised to increase the number of troops operating in the three states, but it is unclear where he will find them. The military is overstretched already. It is not clear whether Nigeria has even met its commitment to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for a Mali force that is being placed under the UN authority. In his declaration, Jonathan indicated that he will be seeking international support; already at the Baga massacre Nigerien and Chadian forces were involved, as well as Nigerian.

During previous states of emergency, the state governor was removed. This time, Jonathan has stated explicitly that the governors and other officials of the three states are to continue to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. Borno and Yobe have governors from the opposition ANPP. Adamawa’s governor is from Jonathan’s PDP.

According to the Nigerian media, traditional opinion leaders in the North opposed a state of emergency. However, in the immediate aftermath of Jonathan’s declaration they have been cautious. Within the National Assembly, which must approve a declaration of a state of emergency, there appears to be support for Jonathan’s move.

The declaration of a state of emergency may be linked to proposals of an amnesty for Boko Haram–the amnesty would play the carrot to the state of emergency’s stick. Jonathan earlier established a committee to explore the modalities for a possible amnesty. Thus far, however, Islamist spokesmen have shown no interest. Over the weekend an alleged Boko Haram spokesman said that there would be no talks unless or until the government released the Boko Haram women and children it is holding. Islamists are themselves now kidnapping women and children, apparently holding them as hostages for the release of their own.

Jonathan’s acknowledgement that there is an insurrection in the North is a step toward realism. Up to now, the government has treated Boko Haram as terrorist episodes. However, the declaration of a state of emergency appears to be a further step toward responding to the crisis in the North through military rather than political means. In the aftermath of the massacre at Baga and the New York Times reports of masses of corpses in Maiduguri; the increased militancy is a step backward. Up to now, the brutality of the Nigerian security services appears to generate support for the Islamists. That could continue.

President Goodluck Jonathan has refused to say whether he will run for the presidency in 2015, although many Nigerians expect he will. The current efforts among the opposition parties to come together behind a single presidential candidate is based on the assumption that Jonathan will run.

Jonathan may not have much choice. His constituency in the southern half of the country and among fellow Christians is likely to insist on it. A notorious Delta militant and thug, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari, posted a reminder on May 6 of that reality. In a rambling and often incoherent press conference, he said that if Jonathan, a fellow Ijaw, is not re-elected in 2015, not only will there be no peace in the oil-rich Niger Delta, there will be no peace anywhere in Nigeria:

“I want to go on to say that there will be no peace, not only in the Niger Delta, but everywhere if Goodluck Jonathan is not president by 2015 except God takes his life, which we don’t pray for. Jonathan has uninterrupted eight years of two terms to be president, according to the Nigeria constitution.” According to Nigerian media, he said, “we will continue to support and stand by Goodluck.”

In effect, Dokubo Asari’s statement is a threat of renewed Delta violence and is directed at those who would try to deny Jonathan the ruling party’s presidential nomination or those who would vote for an opposition presidential candidate.

The threat is credible. Dokubo Asari is a former president of the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) and leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDVF), one of the most important militant organizations involved in the Delta insurrection during the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo. The fighting ended with an amnesty established by President Yar’Adua and has continued under President Jonathan. The amnesty involved limited disarmament, retraining, and re-integration of militants. It also involved massive payoffs to militant leaders like Dokubo Asari. But, militant groups like the NDVF have not disbanded, they appear to retain access to sophisticated weapons, and they could relaunch mayhem at any time.

Dokubo Asari was born into a distinguished Christian family. He converted to Islam when he dropped out of university. The conversion appears personal rather than political because few Ijaw are Muslim, and the Muslim population in the Delta–the center of Dokubo Asari’s activities–is very small. He claims to be a friend of President Jonathan. He regularly denounces the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, saying that Boko Haram and its nominal leader Abubakar Shekau are un-Islamic because of their “arrogance,” especially for their call for Jonathan’s conversion to Islam. He also denounces the mal-governance of Nigeria by a succession of northern military leaders. He is a reminder that southern bitterness toward the north is based on more than anti-Islam sentiments.

Simukai Tinhu analyzes the staying power of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party in a thoughtful article, “Zimbabwe: Mugabe’s Will to Power.” It was published in ThinkAfrica Press on May 9. Also a “must-read” is the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report “Zimbabwe Elections Scenarios;” it appeared May 6.

The ICG provides a thorough briefing on Zimbabwean legal developments in the run-up to the next elections, a review of domestic politics, and an analysis of the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—with recommendations to Zimbabwe’s “stakeholders.” The ICG report will be widely used as a quick reference.

Tinhu’s much shorter article is an analysis of the sources of Mugabe’s power: manipulation of the voters, intimidation, violence, domination of the media, wholesale abuse of the rule of law, and very good organization. And then there is the charismatic personality of Robert Mugabe, one of Africa’s last surviving “liberation” leaders.

However, in addition, Tinhu cites more subtle advantages. Among those he discusses are:

1) As the most powerful party, ZANU-PF attracts the most skillful politicians. They have created a popular, anti-Western ideology. Support from the West (whether governments, non-governmental organizations, or individuals) for opposition movements or figures only undercuts them and strengthens ZANU-PF.

2) ZANU-PF has a big, permanent support base among rural peasants.

3) ZANU-PF openly plays the race card, using propaganda to the effect that the opposition is seeking the return of “white rule” and conniving with foreigners to loot the country.

Moreover, Tinhu argues credibly that ZANU-PF’s greatest source of strength is cohesion among its elites. He says that in return for their loyalty, ZANU-PF tolerates elite corruption. However, if an individual or faction starts to behave independently, the party passes evidence of corruption to an attorney general. So, corruption keeps talented elites in the party—and prevents them leaving.

Tinhu sees Robert Mugabe as essential to the unity of ZANU-PF polity, but, once he dies, all bets are off. He discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Mugabe’s most likely successors, again according to conventional wisdom: Emmerson Mnangagwa and Joice Mujuru. However, he identifies a new “dark horse,” Saviour Kasukuwere, minister of youth and Mugabe’s point man for “indigenizing” foreign-owned enterprises.

Tinhu’s piece, read with the International Crisis Group report, provides background and analysis as to where Zimbabwe is now and what some of the options for the future might be. Both are a useful corrective to the view that Mugabe is so awful that his government could not survive absent repression. The reality is that many Zimbabweans support Mugabe and ZANU-PF out of conviction as well as fear. A central reality of Zimbabwe is land hunger. Mugabe drove the whites off the land by riding roughshod over the rule of law and destroying the economy, in the short turn. But from the perspective of many Africans, he achieved justice. This provides him a strong support base, which he augments through corruption and coercion.

With Mali’s implosion, Islamic extremism in the Sahel, and the “Boko Haram” insurgency in Nigeria’s north drawing international attention, the Niger Delta has dropped off the radar of many West Africa watchers. Yet, only five years ago an insurrection there resulted in a major reduction in Nigeria’s oil production and impacted on state revenue. In 2009, then-president Umaru Yar’Adua introduced an “amnesty” that has been continued by President Goodluck Jonathan and ended (or at least reined-in) that cycle of violence. The United States Institute for Peace has just published an assessment of the amnesty by Aaron Sayne. The report is based on a wide range of interviews, but he cautions that it not a rigorous assessment of the amnesty’s success because the necessary data is absent. Nevertheless, the tone of his report is positive.

Sayne sees the amnesty as having resulted in a significant cut in armed attacks on oil installations and a fall in expatriate kidnappings. Oil production has increased substantially. He suggests that the retraining of many former militants and their subsequent job placement has had “demonstrable, if somewhat limited success.”

Sayne characterizes some of the conventional criticism of the amnesty as misplaced. He acknowledges that the amnesty does not establish a political process to address Delta issues, but, he argues, that function is beyond the scope of an amnesty. He does not accept that amnesty payoffs to militant leaders has transformed them into warlords, and maintains that the Nigerian state retains a greater degree of control over the Delta than has been the case for territories of other states afflicted with warlordism, such as Liberia, Somalia, or Afghanistan.

Readers will find especially useful his discussion of various scenarios for renewal of violence in the run up to the elections of 2015. They will take heart from his conclusion that a violent upsurge, while possible, is by no means inevitable. His conclusion: “despite many worrying signals, a return to major violent conflict (in the Delta) does not look inevitable at this point. The road ahead is far too busy for doomsday forecasts, and Nigeria tends to embarrass those who predict its imminent unraveling.”

This is a guest post by Jacob Zenn, a research analyst at The Jamestown Foundation, and Atta Barkindo, a Ph.D. candidate, SOAS, University of London.

Since launching an insurgency in northern Nigeria in September 2010, Boko Haram leader Abu Shekau and his spokesmen have issued more than thirty statements to the Nigerian press and recorded a number of videos to claim attacks. In Shekau’s and other Boko Haram leaders’ pre-2010 sermons, the languages they use are Hausa and Arabic, not English. Shekau goes so far as to claim that the English language in northern Nigeria destroyed the traditional Arabic language education system for the region’s Muslims. We have reviewed Boko Haram sermons from before 2010, and our conclusions below are directly based on our interpretation of them in their original languages. We believe a study of these sermons is an important source for understanding the evolving Islamic insurgency in northern Nigeria that has been mostly overlooked, in part because their languages make them inaccessible to most Western observers.

Boko Haram’s target audience for its propaganda has often been northern Nigerians, especially those who live in the border towns between Nigeria and neighboring Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. In Boko Haram videos and statements, Shekau and his spokesmen have tried to explain away–and even justify–the deaths of innocent Muslims in Boko Haram attacks. That Christians, the Nigerian government and security forces, and the United States, including President Obama, have become Boko Haram’s main enemies is clear in Boko Haram’s messaging.

However, what is less understood about Boko Haram is the ideology that its three main leaders espoused before 2010, including late founder Muhammad Yusuf, Shekau, and the Cameroonian Muhammad (Mamman) Nur; who according to the Nigerian media and State Security Service masterminded the August 2011 bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja after training in Somalia. Before 2010, they were all salafist imams preaching mostly in the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque of Boko Haram’s base state of Borno in far northeastern Nigeria. Listening to the recordings of their speeches in Hausa and Kanuri helps us understand Boko Haram ideology at a time when its leaders were speaking candidly and not issuing the type of propaganda that the group has issued since launching the insurgency in September 2010.

Here are the key characteristics of Yusuf, Shekau, and Nur’s sermons from 2009, or earlier.

Yusuf: There is no doubt Yusuf organized and transformed the ideological basis of the emerging Boko Haram before his execution in 2009. His sermons suggest that there is a need for the spiritual and moral renewal of Muslims in Nigeria and that the current Muslim leadership has failed them. His statements show that he was a salafist and sympathizer of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. He rejected secularism and western civilization, and he was committed to jihad to cleanse the Nigerian state of corruption and impunity, while also seeking to establish an independent Islamic state within Nigeria.

Nur: Muhammad Nur appears to be more radical, aggressive, and internationally oriented than Yusuf. He believes Nigerian Muslims must counter secularism in Nigeria in every way possible, including jihad, and he speaks out against what he believes is the domination of the Muslim world by the West. Nur symbolizes the crossroads of Boko Haram from local salafism into international jihadism, which is consistent with the attack he allegedly masterminded on the UN (all other Boko Haram attacks up to that point were on Nigerian targets).

Shekau: Shekau comes across as a very persuasive speaker, excellent in classical Arabic and well versed in Islamic scholarship. He could be regarded as the key thinker and ideological weaver of the group, especially where his sermons show a synthesis of local salafist preaching with calls for international jihadism and breaking down the Western and U.S.-led world order. He venerates hard line salafists from Ibn Taymiyya to Osama Bin Laden, and his sermons suggest that he is a political instrumentalist who manipulates religious memory to advance jihad in the modern day against the Nigerian government.