Just as I thought I could put the finishing touches on my book manuscript, Japanese Domestic Politics and the Rise of China (Columbia University Press), which has a chapter on Yasukuni, the issue erupted again to confound Japan’s diplomatic relations.

The revival of Yasukuni Shrine visits presents a serious diplomatic setback for Tokyo. The costs have been high and the benefits hard to find. (Jennifer Lind wrote a great piece on this in March before this week’s headlines.)

More importantly, it reveals the reactive nationalisms afoot in Northeast Asia that are dangerous and unpredictable.

The debate over Yasukuni is fraught with political tensions, even within Japan. There are some who would liken it to America’s Arlington Cemetery, but this is wrong. There are no deep divisions in the United States over Arlington, or over those who lie there. Postwar Japanese however have been deeply ambivalent about the politics of Yasukuni Shrine, and the effort to try to give it the same standing as Arlington cemetery—to legally designate it as a national war memorial—has been defeated over and over again in the Japanese parliament on the grounds that the Shinto shrine violated the postwar Constitution’s separation of church and state.

Yasukuni Shrine also carries the stigma of state secrecy and complicit activism. The inclusion of the Class-A war criminals was done furtively in 1978 at the behest of a Yasukuni Shrine official, Nagayoshi Matsudaira. When the Japanese media found out almost a year later, it reignited the emotional differences between left and right over the proper place for commemorating Japan’s defeat and the losses, both civilian and military, the nation suffered. It is significant that Japan’s Emperor Hirohito, who had presided over the invasion of China and the Pacific War, stopped visiting Yasukuni Shrine once the Class-A war criminals were included.

The annual ceremony presided over by the Emperor and Empress of Japan, and attended by the prime minister and his cabinet, continues to be the place of preference for commemorating August 15 among the Japanese public. In Japanese, August 15 is referred to as the day World War II ended (終戦記念日); the official commemoration is referred to as “the day for mourning of war dead and praying for peace” (戦歿者を追悼し平和を祈念する日).

Previous prime ministers have sought to demonstrate their sympathy with Japan’s Imperial veterans by visiting Yasukuni on August 15. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine in 1984/5 and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi promised Japan’s veterans families that he would do so as well. Koizumi finally realized his promise in 2006, his fifth year in office. Nakasone and Koizumi both confronted the outrage of China and South Korea when they visited, and the balancing act between their desire to satisfy their conservative followers and to maintain good relations with neighboring countries proved extraordinarily difficult.

The Koizumi years proved salutary, however, for the national conversation in Japan over war responsibility and Yasukuni Shrine’s place in the national commemoration of Japan’s war dead. As chief cabinet secretary under Koizumi, Yasuo Fukuda led a task force to consider an alternative national memorial, one that would not be of a religious nature. Former prime minister Taro Aso also advocated for a national secular memorial when he ran for the leadership of his party, and thus his visit to Yasukuni as deputy prime minister this week seems puzzling.

Not all of those whose family members died in World War II find solace in the politicization of Yasukuni. During the Koizumi-era debate, the idea that the Emperor of Japan could visit Yasukuni seemed more important to some families of Japan’s war dead than the prime minister’s visit.

Likewise many Japanese were forced to consider the question of war responsibility. A Yomiuri Shimbun series of articles prompted a national conversation, and even those with longstanding and deep differences over the question of Japan’s history—the leading editorial writers of the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun respectively—got together to discuss the assumptions in their positions on the war and on how it shapes Japanese postwar national identity.

Yet this remains an incomplete conversation, one that today has become deeply entwined with Yasukuni Shrine’s role as a symbol of conservative nationalism. For others, Yasukuni Shrine has become a symbol of Japan’s inability to make a break with its past, and to fully allow the generation who died in the war—civilians and those who wore the Emperor’s uniform—to be given a place where all Japanese can honor them.

Yasukuni Shrine visits have always been steeped in politics. The domestic debate over Yasukuni prompted by Koizumi’s pledge to his followers in many ways encouraged a healthy conversation about topics that had long been too difficult for many Japanese to address. But it did not legitimize the practice. Since then, many individual politicians have made their own trips to Yasukuni, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has visited on several occasions although not as prime minister.

But there is a new edge to the domestic activism on Yasukuni this week.

Nationalism seems to beget nationalism among the nations of Northeast Asia, and political leaders should find little comfort in the growing popular sensitivities in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo to perceived slight and impugned motive. The diplomatic protest, and cancellation of the visit to Tokyo by South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, seemed to invite a reaction in kind. The defiant march into Yasukuni Shrine on Tuesday, sponsored by the Let’s Go to Yasukuni Together group of politicians, was clearly meant as a political signal to Japan’s neighbors.

Even the language used in Japan’s parliament to the effect that Japanese won’t be intimidated suggested a new reactive motive for Yasukuni Shrine visits, a motive that many of us outside the country find difficult to understand.

Tokyo today needs to look outward, to find common cause with its friends in Asia and across the globe, rather than retreat into isolation. Postwar Japan’s accomplishments, not the divisive symbols of its past, should continue to guide its choices. Japan’s postwar generation, conservatives and liberals alike, embraced a new future with different values, and created the tremendous energy needed to lead their nation into a different era.

Rather than turn to defiant gestures, Japan’s contemporary political leaders—conservative and liberal alike—must have the courage to lead the way to firmer ground upon which to base their children and grandchildren’s future. Yasukuni may always be the place of commemoration for a generation of Japanese who seek to honor their family members who fought in the name of the Emperor.

But for the Japan of today, the nation that has committed itself to avoiding war and building peace and democratic values, perhaps the time has come to embrace Mr. Fukuda’s plan for the construction of an alternative memorial, one where all Japanese and non-Japanese can honor those who gave their lives for their country.

Tokyo has thus far kept a low profile as Seoul and Washington responded to the steady stream of threats emanating from Pyongyang. Today, however, as governments around the region prepare for a likely missile launch, and perhaps even another nuclear test, the Abe cabinet announced serious preparations to defend Japan against possible attack.

This round of escalatory tensions emanating from Pyongyang has been a source of deep concern for Japan. Yet the Abe cabinet has maintained quiet vigilance, largely in an effort not to contribute to the dangerous dynamics surrounding the peninsula. Tokyo has been a strong supporter in sanctioning North Korean proliferation. Japanese negotiators worked closely with South Korean and U.S. negotiators to develop sanctions in the wake of the missile test last December, although Japan is not involved directly in UN Security Council deliberations. After the February nuclear test, Japan too reinforced its unilateral sanctions on Pyongyang.

Recent events, however, have stimulated a more proactive defense response from Tokyo. In particular, the threat to target U.S. military bases in the region and in the Pacific has worried Japanese security planners. To date, Kim Jong-un’s regime seemed focused on threatening the United States directly, but North Korea’s assertion that it will use its intermediate range Musudan missiles to launch attacks against U.S. military facilities and personnel in the region puts Japan firmly in the midst of this growing crisis. Japan hosts around 45,000 U.S. forward deployed forces, with bases in northern Honshu as well as the southernmost prefecture of Okinawa.

This morning, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihida Suga, announced that the prime minister had placed Japan’s Self-Defense Force on “full alert status.” Japan’s defense minister, Itsunori Onodera, had already ordered the Self-Defense Force to mobilize for missile defense. The Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed two AEGIS destroyers to the Sea of Japan, and the Air Self-Defense Force readied its land-based PAC-3 missile interceptors.

This is the fourth time Japan has initiated its highest state of defense readiness in response to North Korea’s missile threat. The first was in March 2009, and the second and third in response to missile launches in April and December last year. Each of these followed an announcement by Pyongyang of plans to launch a satellite. This is the first defense order issued by Japan without any stated intention to launch by North Korea.

The idea that Pyongyang could launch a strike without warning prompted this quiet effort to mobilize Japan’s response. There was no cabinet security council meeting nor did forces easily detectable by the North activate their weapons. Since U.S. and South Korean forces also moved into high alert as the North moved its mobile missile launchers carrying the Musudan to its Sea of Japan coast, Tokyo decided that it too could now announce its readiness to the Japanese people.

All of Japanese territory, including vital U.S. military bases, is within the expected range of the Musudan missile. Regardless of Pyongyang’s target, a launch from North Korea’s east coast almost guarantees the trajectory of the missile will be over Japanese territory. The Japanese government will use its national early warning system (J-ALERT) to inform the public at the time of launch, and will be in close contact with U.S. forces in the region.

Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, returned to Tokyo this weekend after his first summit meeting in Washington with President Barack Obama. Post-summit, Abe faces two important economic decisions. The first is his nomination for the next governor of the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The second is whether Japan’s prime minister will urge his party onwards to participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). To succeed, Abe now has to confront some political hurdles at home.

The lack of a majority in the Upper House will mean Abe needs to ensure his BOJ head passes muster with his political opposition. Nominations for a new BOJ governor require approval from both houses of parliament. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a firm majority in the Lower House after its sweeping victory on December 16, but the last time the LDP sought to replace the head of Japan’s central bank it ran into paralyzing opposition in the Upper House. In 2008, the LDP sought to replace then retiring BOJ governor Toshihiko Fukui with Toshiro Muto, a former vice minister of finance, but the opposition-controlled Upper House voted him down. This forced then prime minister Yasuo Fukuda back to the drawing board, and in the end, the current BOJ governor, Masaaki Shirakawa, then a vice governor at the BOJ, became the acting head. Shirakawa has announced he will step down on March 19.

Japanese and global media have been full of speculation over Shirakawa’s replacement ever since the prime minister publicly called for a much more aggressive use of monetary instruments to end Japan’s deflation. Inflation targeting by the BOJ is one of Abe’s preferred policy goals, a core idea in what is now widely referred to as “Abenomics.” Kikuo Iwata, a professor from Gakushuin University, was seen as a bold choice for Abe, according to Bloomberg, since he has called for “a ramping up in Japan’s monetary base to end deflation.” But the name that has recently emerged as the likely pick is a man who was also a contender in 2008, Haruhiko Kuroda, the current head of the Asian Development Bank. Kuroda served in the Ministry of Finance where he managed currency policy from 1999 to 2003, and is on record then arguing that the BOJ should introduce inflation targets. Interestingly, even when LDP-DPJ bickering was at its worst, Kuroda managed to attract opposition party support. It appears Abe will make the politically wise choice and put the more experienced and internationally well-known Kuroda as governor, while nominating the more academic and policy aggressive Iwata as vice governor.

On TPP, the politics are more precarious for the prime minister. In an unusually terse Joint Statement after the Abe-Obama meeting, the two governments confirmed their understanding of the terms of Japan’s participation:

Recognizing that both countries have bilateral trade sensitivities, such as certain agricultural products for Japan and certain manufactured products for the United States, the two Governments confirm that, as the final outcome will be determined during the negotiations, it is not required to make a prior commitment to unilaterally eliminate all tariffs upon joining the TPP negotiations. [The full statement is available here.]

While it leaves much to be desired in terms of syntax, it was apparently enough for most of Japan’s media to believe that their prime minister had just received a major concession from the White House. All of Japan’s major newspapers reported forward momentum coming out of the summit meeting, and Abe’s consultations with coalition partner Komeito president Natsuo Yamaguchi on Monday demonstrated his intent to move quickly. By evening (Tokyo time), Prime Minister Abe had received his party’s approval for his government to make the final decision on when to participate in the TPP. Expectations now are for an announcement at the beginning of March.

Whereas the BOJ nomination provided some short-term political feuding, it is unlikely to be a serious conflict in the Diet. The DPJ leadership has already indicated it understands the public will not be forgiving if politics were to leave the BOJ position unfulfilled for any length of time, and it seems the DPJ has no objection to Kuroda.

The real political risk will be the prime minister’s decision on TPP. With an Upper House election in July, the LDP could suffer at the polls if key supporters, most notably the agricultural cooperatives that benefit from government protections for their activities, remain adamantly opposed.

Opinion polls suggest that anywhere from 60 to 65 percent of the Japanese people support participation in TPP, and the prime minister is gaining in public support (70 percent and rising after his Washington trip). Japan’s business leaders also openly call for Japan’s participation, and Abe himself seems buoyed by the stock and currency markets’ response to his “Abenomics.”

In Washington, Mr. Abe declared that “Japan is Back!” It may be too early to declare economic victory, but politically, he has certainly changed the tenor of Japan’s domestic debate. With a TPP decision seemingly forthcoming, it seems Mr. Abe is gambling on boldness. Let’s see if he can carry his party—and its constituents—with him.

This week yet another ratcheting up of tensions between Japanese and Chinese forces in the East China Sea drew our attention. Alongside the incremental escalation of danger inherent in these interactions is the dueling narratives about what is actually happening on the ground—or, more accurately, on the water and in the air. The confusing stories coming out of Northeast Asian capitals only complicate an already worrisome  situation, one that could easily result in a local commander behaving badly or miscalculating.

The latest iteration is the intriguing Chinese response to the most recent incident. The Japanese government protested a Chinese Jiangwei-II class naval frigate’s use of radar to actively target Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer Yudachi. The incident occurred on January 30 in waters 100–200 kilometers (62–124 miles) northwest of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A similar incident apparently occurred on January 19 when a MSDF helicopter was the object of a firing radar lock by a Chinese Jiangkai-I class frigate, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

At first, Beijing authorities did not acknowledge the incident, but noted the report in the Japanese media of the incident. Silence then ensued, leading many to speculate that the ship’s commander had not had authorization from Beijing for his actions. On February 8, China’s Ministry of Defense issued a statement saying that fire control radar was not used in either incident and that Japan has “repeatedly spread false accusations which distorted facts and defamed Chinese military’s normal combat readiness training.” A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reported the results of the Defense Ministry’s investigation, stated that the incident never happened, and accused Japan of “completely making something out of nothing.”

Adding to this effort to claim nothing happened are the Russians, who apparently sent two SU-27 jets into Japanese airspace to the northwest of Hokkaido. When the Russian Defense Ministry denied the event, saying its military aircraft flew in “strict accordance with international rules governing airspace,” the Japanese government offered to hand over the data to prove it. Why exactly the Russians would want to exacerbate an already tense situation between Japan and China is unclear. Japan has little incentive to make up an incident since Japan’s prime minister has personally argued for better relations with Moscow.

Exchanging data over these types of incidents would be wise for all concerned, but particularly for Japan and China. If Tokyo and Beijing want to contain the escalatory dynamics between their forces in the East China Sea, then this would be the right moment to begin to work on processes for better managing an already dangerous situation. Noteworthy is the Chinese acknowledgement that this kind of radar targeting is a “dangerous act,” and one that the Beijing government would recognize as unacceptable.

The finger pointing over who is raising the stakes, Japan or China, can blur lines of communication within governments as easily as between them. Local commanders must understand who is in charge in Beijing and in Tokyo. Sharing data between central government authorities on incidents such as these would build confidence in each country’s desire to avoid serious incidents between their two militaries. Equally important, it would help Japanese and Chinese governments be fully confident that each is in full control of their militaries.

President Obama,

As you consider America’s foreign policy challenges, I would urge you to pay particular attention to Northeast Asia. I believe U.S. policy will be tested in this part of Asia, and that our maritime commitments in particular will require clear and committed action. There are leadership transitions there too that deserve some of your personal engagement in building trust.

Let me suggest three areas where I think significant policy attention is warranted.

First, your new foreign policy team will need to embrace your Asia strategy as fully as their predecessors. Asia demands our full and long-term strategic attention and articulating the future direction of the Asia pivot will be essential to maintaining regional confidence in the United States. For those of us who care deeply about U.S. policy towards Asia, your first term Asia team could not have been better. Your second term Asia team will need to be given far deeper resources if they too are to successfully execute your Asia strategy. Strong leadership and deep Asia experience and expertise will continue to be the prerequisites for success, especially in relations with Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing. In Northeast Asia, where tensions have risen considerably over the past year, our ability to lend our allies a steadying hand will be most needed and most appreciated.

Second, Northeast Asia has undergone a broad leadership transition. New leaders in Beijing, Tokyo, Pyongyang, and soon in Seoul will mean that we will need to take time to build new relationships. I’m least optimistic about Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un seems to be committed to less cooperation rather than more, and his actions suggest little reason for optimism about change in North Korea’s military ambitions. December’s successful missile test, as well as his recent response to the enhanced UN sanctions, suggest we are in for a bumpy ride in 2013. On the positive side, leadership changes in Seoul and Tokyo bring in two leaders committed to their relationship with Washington, and ready to work closely with the United States on a whole range of issues, including how to cope with North Korea. Yet relations between these two close allies are strained and will take time to heal. We should do all that we can to support that process, and sustain the energy of our trilateral policy cooperation.

It is the new generation of leaders in China that will deserve your most careful consideration. It is too early to tell if Xi Jinping will prove to be a good partner for the United States in Asia and beyond. But the most immediate test of his new government may be whether he proves to be a good neighbor. For many on the periphery of a rising China, these are uncertain times. Our interests on the Korean peninsula, and more recently on the territorial dispute with Japan, differ considerably from China’s. On both of these issues, we must persuade Beijing that maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia is our common cause. If needed, Beijing must be reminded that we will defend our treaty allies from coercion and provocation, and we should be unambiguous in our commitment to the defense of Japan should Beijing escalate its island dispute with Tokyo to the level of armed conflict.

Yet we must also lead the effort to develop mechanisms and institutions that will facilitate dispute resolution and confidence building in Asia. Continuing to energize the ASEAN-based institutions for multilateral problem-solving will be important. An annual meeting of defense ministers would be particularly helpful at this time. The East China Sea deserves American attention also, and we should reach out to Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo to consider crisis management practices and a regime for maritime confidence-building. There is far too much at stake for all of us not to try to de-escalate and regularize maritime interactions there.

Finally, President Obama, let me turn to a relationship that anchors our Asia strategy and without which we cannot implement the rebalancing that you envision. The U.S.-Japan alliance has for half a century demonstrated the power of postwar reconciliation, and the relationship today between the American and Japanese people is strong and our shared interests abiding. We saw that in the Japanese response to 9/11 and Katrina, and you reciprocated when the need was greatest in Japan in the wake of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that hit on March 11.

Japan today faces a rising China, a nuclear North Korea, and difficult political relations with its neighbors in South Korea and even Russia. In the face of these challenges, there are many in Japan who think it is time to change course; to reconsider Japan’s postwar diplomacy and strategic choice of military self-restraint. There is, I believe, a growing perception within Japan that their postwar commitments have not been rewarded with friendship and respect, and that they continue to be punished for events that cannot today be undone.

I believe the Japanese people will wisely reaffirm their postwar convictions, but U.S. policy will play a large role in shaping both the substance and the tenor of that Japanese debate. If our alliance with Japan is strong, then the concerns about today’s challenges in Northeast Asia will be met carefully and calmly. Your leadership will be needed to set higher sights for this vital partnership. We must fulfill our promise to close Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, and rid our relationship of this debilitating squabble. We must encourage Japan to stand with us on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But neither of these issues should define our relationship with Tokyo.

Historical reconciliation is a tremendous challenge for the peoples of Northeast Asia, and in today’s changing strategic environment, nationalism can easily become corrosive. Our role cannot simply be one of strategic partner; we must also consider our own role in shaping the destiny of Northeast Asia. Your ambassador, John V. Roos, began our process of healing the wounds of World War II by commemorating the tremendous loss of life in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in doing so, he earned the profound admiration of the Japanese people. When so many in the region today are having difficulty in finding an adequate expression of forgiveness for that terrible chapter of history, you have the opportunity to lead the way—to illuminate the path toward acknowledging the terrible costs of war.

Northeast Asia continues to require your close attention, Mr. President. The last several years have demonstrated that some of our most important alliance commitments are coming under strain as a dynamic shift in the regional balance of power is fostering anxious nationalisms. Your Asia policy team will need to be steady and creative; will need to be bold and subtle; and, most of all will need to know how to work comfortably within this new and emerging Asia

This blog post is part of a series entitled Is Japan in Decline?, in which leading experts analyze Japan’s economy, politics, and society and give their assessment of Japan’s future.

Last year, as Japanese were getting ready to vote in the Lower House election, I hosted a broad conversation on the question of whether Japan was in “decline.” The result was a two-week conversation on the subject that began with America’s foremost Japan politics specialist, Columbia University’s Gerald Curtis. Our experts included the chairman of Japan’s leading business executives forum, American social scientists, a distinguished Japanese scholar of China, non-profit foundation executives, a successful global entrepreneur from Japan, and concluded with the thoughts of two smart Japanese twenty-somethings.

The responses to my simple question—is Japan in decline?—were as varied as the participants. The discussion raised many questions as to how to evaluate Japan’s current government policies, but it also highlighted many aspects of Japanese civil society that shed a more sophisticated and positive light on Japanese society. For some, Japan’s future is dimmer; for others, there is plenty of evidence that suggests the Japanese are doing just fine (or at least, no worse than the rest of us).

Off-blog, I heard many comments from friends in the field. They directed me to their own work on this topic, such as this insightful piece on Japan’s economy by Columbia Business School professor emeritus Hugh Patrick. I even stimulated a thoughtful op-ed in the Washington Post by Harvard University professor emeritus Ezra Vogel, the scholar originally interviewed in Chico Harlan’s piece last October.

But there are four more who have been waiting patiently in the wings as Japan’s elections and new government captured our attention, and so this week, I would like to add their thoughts to conclude our series. We begin with insights on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s challenges ahead in reversing Japan’s decline from Yomiuri’s senior political writer, followed by some thoughtful suggestions for Japan from two American observers, and we conclude with a provocative suggestion from a widely-acclaimed Japanese scholar to allow Japan to have some breathing room in its effort at “soul-searching.”

In closing, let me thank all of our guest bloggers. It has been a terrific and rich discussion, and I am delighted to have been able to bring such a diverse and revelatory conversation on Japan to Asia Unbound.

The essays in this project will remain on CFR.org at a dedicated site: Is Japan in Decline?

My phone has been ringing this week with journalists and others asking for clarification on what Japan is doing with its defense policy. The tone of the questions reveal the growing concern about the security dynamics in Northeast Asia, and specifically the growing worry that Japan and China could be headed for an even more serious clash over disputed islands.

So first let’s sort through the various announcements on defense policy emanating from Tokyo.

Is the Japanese defense budget going to be raised by 2.6 percent? Looks like it. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will request 120 billion yen ($1.3 billion) more in fiscal year 2013 than it did last year. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Policy Research Council supported this request in a highly publicized statement on January 7. The budget has yet to be decided and there are negotiations still ahead; however, we should expect Japan’s defense spending to go up. This will be the first increase in eleven years for MOD.

The fiscal year 2012 supplementary budget approved today by the Abe cabinet also included spending on defense. MOD requested 212 billion yen ($2.4 billion) to spend on telecommunications equipment, base renovations, and missile defense capabilities. The Japan Coast Guard, part of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, also requested funds for six additional patrol ships.

Isn’t this shocking? No. Relatively speaking, Japan has successfully limited growth in its defense spending over the past decade. Compare for example the growth in annual defense spending by its neighbors. China’s defense budget is estimated to have grown by more than 10 percent annually, and South Korea’s defense spending has grown from 5 to 10 percent annually. Japan’s decision to up its defense spending may be a surprise, but it is long overdue.

Did the Abe cabinet decide to purchase an aircraft carrier? No. (At least, not yet.) This question came from a Chinese journalist, and refers to the request for a helicopter equipped destroyer in next year’s budget. Not quite an aircraft carrier, at least of the variety that China just deployed or those that the U.S. Navy maintains. But there is plenty in the new MOD request to signal Japan’s concern over its southwestern waters. In addition to the new destroyer, the MOD request includes a submarine, two P-1 reconnaissance aircraft, upgrades to E-767 early warning planes, and other measures devised to up its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Is this evidence of a rise in Japanese militarism? Hardly. There is a serious debate among policymakers as to whether this is actually sufficient to deal with the growing challenges Japan could face in the years ahead. Prime Minister Abe’s new government is widely seen as more hawkish, and thus the interpretation of this budget’s meaning differs widely. Martin Fackler’s NYT piece early in the week sees this as the new prime minister’s effort “to bolster Japan’s declining influence,” while a WSJ article views this week’s announcements in Tokyo as “paltry” and instead admonishes Japan’s new prime minister “to get serious about defense, and fast.” Expect this conversation to continue as the specifics of Japan’s defense policy develop.

Will Prime Minister Abe use this new defense budget to beef up Japan’s southwestern (including Senkaku Islands) defenses? Yes, indeed. His predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, already began that process in October last year when he outlined an enhanced budget (17 billion yen, or $190 million) for Japan’s coast guard. New patrol ships with upgraded image transmissions systems for their helicopters are already under procurement, with an expected deployment in 2015. In the meantime, older vessels will be extended in service until the newer ships come online. The 11th Regional Fleet based in Naha, Okinawa, has been enhanced to cope with a 24/7 patrol schedule now needed to respond to the increase in Chinese patrols in and around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, Japan’s coast guard will need even more resources if it is to continue to match the growing deployments of Chinese vessels.

Yet again, a transition in Japan’s government has resulted in revamping Japan’s defense policy, confusing observers about the ultimate aims envisioned for Japan’s military. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in 2009, it delayed the regular defense planning exercise that produces the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for a year. The conceptual basis that ultimately came out of that thinking process, however, was novel and widely seen as balanced and effective. With an emphasis on flexibility and readiness, MOD put forward a new “dynamic defense” concept that was in reality the first doctrinal response to Japan’s evolving security environment. Force posture adjustments clearly placed priority on Japan’s far strung islands in the southwest, and air and maritime defenses for this region were given top billing.

However, on December 27, Abe’s new defense minister, Itsunori Onodera, announced the 2010 NDPG would be abandoned, and another one would be produced by the end of 2013. Given the broad praise for the 2010 NDPG, it seems odd to want to throw it out, and the decision strongly reeks of politics rather than strategy. The imprimatur of the former ruling party may simply have been too distasteful, but in throwing the baby out with the bathwater, the rationale for Japan’s abrupt decision to up its defense budget now seems less than clear.

This week’s mixed signals are bound to feed into the speculation that Japan is poised for a more militarized interaction with its neighbors. The lack of clarity between ends and means muddies the waters. To be sure, Japan’s defenses have long had vulnerabilities that need attention. Perhaps a wiser approach would be to go about enhancing those vulnerabilities, quickly and with purpose, without yet another long drawn out—and potentially deeply politicized—rewording of what is essentially sound policy.

Early this morning, East China Sea time, China sent a small reconnaissance plane into Japanese airspace over the Senkaku Islands. Too small to register on Japan’s air defense radar, but large enough to make a point, this propeller jet assigned to the Chinese Marine Surveillance Agency was perfectly timed to take advantage of the distraction of North Korea’s missile launch.

China and Japan have been drawing lines in the waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands for the Chinese) almost daily since the Japanese government under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda purchased these islands from a private owner on September 11. China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, has consistently argued that Japan escalated the bilateral dispute over these small uninhabited islands by “nationalizing” them. China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi took his case to the United Nations, where he derided the Japanese government for challenging the post-WWII settlement in Asia.

Beyond this rhetorical onslaught, however, seems to be a more calculated tactical test of Tokyo by Beijing. Since Noda’s decision, China’s Marine Surveillance Agency ships as well as Fisheries Agency patrols have made visits to the Senkaku Islands a daily occurrence. Soon after the Japanese announcement of purchase, some of these vessels traversed territorial waters in a show of bravado. Since then, these ships have more often than not passed through the contiguous waters, a demonstration of China’s ability to deploy in waters around the islands but not as direct an assertion of Chinese intent as entry into Japan’s twelve nautical mile territorial waters. Nonetheless, today Japan’s chief cabinet secretary Osamu Fujimura noted that in the past three days Chinese vessels have again focused their attention on Japan’s territorial waters.

The Japan Coast Guard has met these intrusions with a steady patrol of vessels. Both Chinese and Japanese vessels have conveyed their right to be in these waters. For the most part, this maritime standoff has been well-managed, with Chinese and Japanese crews carefully avoiding any behavior that might cause a miscalculation by the other side. Japan, however, has little interest in sustained tensions in the East China Sea. Today, Japan Coast Guard commandant Takashi Kitamura, in a statement at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, implied that Japan would be willing to decrease its patrols if China did the same.

But the import of the enhanced Chinese maritime presence in Senkaku waters seems clear. By asserting its ability to deploy and maintain a steady presence around these islands, Beijing is testing what has to date been a monopoly on policing of these waters by Japan’s Coast Guard. Diplomatic protests by Japan notwithstanding China has slowly and steadily demonstrated that it can—and it will—assert its right to operate in the waters and now in the air over the disputed islands.

This morning’s flight introduced a new dimension to China’s test of Japan’s response. Coming in under the radar, at an altitude of 300 meters, the Chinese aircraft (Harbin Y-12) was discovered only by a sighting from a Japan Coast Guard vessel. Moreover, it flew directly over the Senkaku Islands without interference, causing considerable concern in the Japanese media about Japan’s defenses.

Interesting also is the timing of the flight. The region was focused on the surprising launch of a North Korean missile when this low flying reconnaissance flight went undetected by Japan’s radar. This implies that China is willing to use the opportunity afforded by other crises to test Japan, and to reveal vulnerabilities that Japan has not had to redress before. In small but consistent ways, China is pushing Japan to improve its defenses, to take steps to actively defend its southwestern islands.

Japan ought to do this. But Japanese leaders must also be alert to the possibility of a broader aim. Beijing is playing a dangerous game, one that increasingly appears to be aimed at isolating Tokyo. Support for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Sunday’s Lower House election is likely to grow in response to Chinese pressure on Japan’s defenses, and herein may lay Beijing’s real purpose.

Perhaps what Beijing is hoping to accomplish is to demonstrate that Japan’s postwar policy of limited self-defense has created vulnerabilities for Japan, vulnerabilities that a more hawkish LDP might consider rectifying. Revising the constitution, renaming Japan’s Self-Defense Force, asserting a more militarized national identity—these are all part of what Beijing could then point to as evidence that “Japanese militarism” is again on the rise.

This small flight over the Senkakus may seem innocuous, but it signals a creeping effort to change the administrative control over the islands. Within Japan, it creates deeper challenges for those who come into power this coming Sunday. Japan must be shrewd and calm; defend its territory and assert its desire for reconciliation. It must enhance its air and maritime defenses in the southwestern region, but it must also carefully consider the danger of relying on political symbols and assertions that feed into the vision of a “right-wing” nationalistic Japan that Beijing would be only too happy to exploit.

Baiting Japan’s politicians into a more reactive stance on the eve of an election…Welcome to the new Japan-China relationship.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Is Japan in Decline?, in which leading experts analyze Japan’s economy, politics, and society and give their assessment of Japan’s future.

Japan is now in the throes of another election, with myriad politicians and parties competing for media air time. While this political drama is capturing the headlines inside Japan, outside the country a more dismissive tone has crept into the conversation about Japan’s future.

A number of public statements in the U.S. media, most notably the front page article in the Washington Post last month, have heralded Japan’s decline. When the Republican candidate for office this summer made an offhand reference to Japan’s decline, I responded by pointing out all that Japan is and does in global affairs and why Japan is so important to the United States. But beyond the policy benefits of our alliance with Japan, I encounter many Americans who ask me about the decreasing role played by Tokyo in global and regional affairs.

Journalists and commentators in Tokyo as well worry that Japan is less important globally. The Nikkei Shimbun on November 18 released results of its public opinion poll on Japan’s future, and a whopping 71 percent of respondents indicated they believed Japan has less influence globally.

For Americans, this “declinism” will sound rather familiar. After all, we have gone through periods in our recent history when many thought the United States was no longer vibrant and capable of reform at home, and thus was losing influence internationally. In fact, we are in the midst of another moment of reassessment of our own national promise today.

Is Japan on an inevitable path towards decline? Is our attachment to the “decline” thesis itself or to its application to Japan? Why do we need to label Japan at all? Perhaps we oversold its “rise” and so now feel compelled to explain its fall. Perhaps the answer is more related to the frame of reference we bring to analyzing Japan.

What we certainly need is some expert commentary. Current accounts of Japan’s “decline” offer little insight about the transformations ongoing within Japan that are shaping national choices, choices ultimately that could either strengthen or temper Japan’s ability to play a vibrant role abroad.

I asked my friends and colleagues, who work across the spectrum of disciplines, if they thought Japan was in decline or not, and where they focused their gaze when considering Japan’s future. I will tell you from the outset that just about everyone I reached out to are experts who have spent considerable time—if not their entire careers—analyzing Japan and its economy, politics, and society. In that sense, it is a deeply biased sample.

But as you will see, the bias does not run in the direction of unbridled support for all things Japan. I did not get uniform answers to my question of whether they thought Japan was in decline, nor did I get unalloyed pessimism or optimism. What I did get is a series of thoughtful commentary that suggests there are other, better lenses through which we should be viewing Japanese experience.

For the next week or so, as Japanese voters consider how to choose leaders who can transform their future, Asia Unbound will feature this conversation with guest posts by Gerald Curtis (Columbia University), Jennifer Lind (Dartmouth College), Kathryn Ibata-Arens (DePaul University), Matthew Marr (Florida International University), Robert Madsen (Center for International Studies, MIT), Yasuchika Hasegawa (Chairman of the Keizai Doyukai), David Janes (U.S.-Japan Foundation), Akio Takahara (University of Tokyo),and David Boling (Mansfield Foundation).

I urge you to comment and join in. However you feel about Japan’s presence (or absence) in international affairs, these essays will undoubtedly reveal that the “declinist” argument is far too unfocused a lens through which to view this complex nation.

Japan’s politicians have been released from legislative deliberations, and are rushing to prepare for the next Lower House election, scheduled for December 16. The media is in hot pursuit as politicians change allegiances and new parties emerge and join forces against Japan’s old legislative guard. There is a frenzy of criticism against Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his much maligned ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). But to think this election is just a referendum against the DPJ misses the point. This election will shape Japan’s choices for years to come.

Ever since the DPJ came into power, the effort to force it back into an election has driven opposition parties, most notably the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Several rounds of no-confidence votes were put forward in the Diet, one purportedly a deal between the DPJ’s Ichiro Ozawa and then LDP president Sadakazu Tanigaki. Electoral ambitions colored policy deliberations, and a policy consensus between the DPJ and the LDP proved illusory.

Today’s excitement is enjoyed only by the politicians. Personal loyalties are being tested, and individual politicians, first and foremost within Prime Minister Noda’s own party, are sidling up to new partners in preparation for this next election. Yet the notion persists that members of the DPJ and the LDP, not all that far apart in their interests and sentiments, should become the foundation of another round of political realignment. For many Japanese, the erosion of the single party dominance is lamented as part of Japan’s political problem, and thus the solution is simply to build a new party that will once again bring the calm and stately management of government back in a new guise.

But watching the currents of politics in Tokyo these days, I find this idea of a grand coalition hard to grasp. First of all, this idea seems to overlook the fact that the DPJ itself was a realignment of this type, a forging of a coalition among those who wanted to put forward a viable political party that could contest the LDP’s longstanding grip on power. The coalition that emerged as the DPJ was hard to manage, however, once the party took power. Second, the erosion in DPJ membership, most notably the decision by Ozawa and his followers to leave the party in July, may have strengthened the DPJ rather than weakened it. Those who remain—such as Noda, Katsuya Okada, Koichiro Genba, Seiji Maehara, Yukio Edano, Motohisa Furukawa, and Goshi Hosono to name just a few—are staunchly reformist in their beliefs, and they have considerable experience in government. At a time when the party seems increasingly defined by their leadership, I find it hard to believe that they will want to merge with the LDP.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the scramble to form new parties suggests to me that Japanese politics continues to fracture rather than congeal. These new parties aim to position themselves for leverage over the new government once the election is over. In the short term, the first casualty of this process could be the DPJ as more and more politicians seek opportunity on the “winning” side or in opposition to their own party. Public opinion polls at the moment are showing the DPJ and the new Japan Restoration Party with comparable levels of support (with a range of 15 to 16 percent compared with the LDP which tallies about 23 percent). Thus, should the LDP emerge as the biggest winner on December 16, it can choose who to partner with.

The LDP president Shinzo Abe, seen as the most likely to succeed Noda as prime minister, will have to demonstrate that he is able to lead a coalition government. The conservatives will need to vastly expand their legislative presence, currently at 118 seats in Japan’s 480-seat Lower House. No one expects that they will be able to win a majority, but the margin of LDP victory will determine the shape of the coalition they lead.

We should not expect politics in Tokyo to go back to the old days of LDP dominance, although it will be interesting to see what the LDP has learned from its three years in opposition. Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba consistently reminds his fellow conservatives that the LDP cannot expect to return to politics as usual. The new blood widely expected to come into the party in this election is not liable to accept the old rules either. These LDP newcomers will be Ishiba’s children, like Koizumi’s children (2005) and Ozawa’s children (2009), and they will want to succeed visibly in their first term so that they can win public support and re-election. Moreover, others coming up in the party, like the policy savvy and charismatic young political star, Shinjiro Koizumi, are not likely to want a return to the staid hierarchy of the old LDP either.

Like the DPJ, the new LDP will need to be full of reform energy. So what is this political energy to be focused on? If it is simply a chance to deride the DPJ “experiment,” then it will be a wasted effort. Clearly, Japan needs political reform, and each of the new contenders has some radical and not so radical ideas about how to accomplish it. The DPJ in fact began their time in office with some new ideas about transparency and accountability, some of which were very popular with a Japanese public that had grown frustrated with its entrenched bureaucracy and inward looking politicians. Process level change, however, cannot be the sole goal.

Japan faces complex and contradictory sets of challenges. Many of these challenges are economic, and in this, Japan is no different than any other advanced industrial economy. But some of these challenges are particular to Japan’s economic institutions and priorities, and how to energize this national economy in the context of a much changed and still changing global economy. Demographics will matter also, and the social infrastructure to manage Japan’s aging society is not yet fully in place or affordable. Strategically, Japan is in a much different place than it was even a decade ago, and how it positions itself in the world will depend largely on how it organizes itself internally to make decisions and to deliberate options. But it will also depend on a careful analysis of Japan’s choices, including its alliance with Washington and its strained relations with its neighbors.

Finally, some of the social patterns that informed national policy in Japan just no longer exist today, as more and younger Japanese have preferences and choices much different from their parents. Women need a larger place in Japan’s leadership if the country is to thrive. Engaging Japan’s women and youth in the project of recasting Japan’s priorities is perhaps one of the most significant priorities today, and bringing them more fully into the process of politics will be the only way to mobilize their talents and interests looking forward.

Early reports suggest that a large segment of the Japanese public are determined to vote in this next election. In 2009, it was the desire for reform of Japanese politics that led to the overwhelming public support for the new DPJ. There is no sense to date that this interest in reform has vanished. In fact, it has increased. The Japanese people suffered the worst calamity in generations in 2011, as the triple disasters—earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdowns—shook the nation to its core. Nearly 20,000 Japanese lost their lives, and half a million were initially displaced. The danger of Tokyo, a city of thirty million, being inundated by nuclear radiation was imminent.

The country has come through this tremendous test of its society with resilience and pride, and new ideas about Japan’s future prospects have been informed by this experience. Yet its politicians seem mired in the factionalism of the past, and limited in their ability to envision Japan’s future.

December 16 ought to be a referendum on Japan’s future, and the people of Japan will need to choose their next government based on the ideas and the vision for the future that will move their society forward.